Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy since 1936, declared India at war with Germany on 3 September 1939 without consulting any Indian leader. The Congress Working Committee answered by asking the British government to state its war aims and say whether they included freedom for India. Over the following weeks Linlithgow interviewed more than fifty political leaders and princes, including Gandhi and Jinnah. He issued this statement in October 1939; the newspapers printed it on the 18th. The Congress Working Committee rejected it as a restatement of the old imperial policy, and before the end of the month it called on the Congress ministries in the provinces to resign, which they did. It is a statement, not a speech.
Linlithgow declines to define Britain's war aims more precisely at "so early a stage." On India's future, he cites the 1935 promise of the Secretary of State and Lord Irwin's 1929 declaration that "the natural issue of India's progress as there contemplated is the attainment of Dominion Status." He promises that "at the end of the war" the government will consult "representatives of the several communities, parties, and interests, in India, and with the Indian Princes" about changes to the Act of 1935, and he notes that the minorities had urged "full weight" for their views. For now he offers only "a consultative group, representative of all major political parties in British India and of the Indian Princes, over which the Governor-General would himself preside."
[p. 204] "Since the outbreak of war and more particularly during the last four weeks I have been in the closest touch with the leaders of political opinion in British India and with representatives of the Princely Order; and I have spared no effort to acquaint myself by personal discussion with the trend of feeling; to ascertain the views of the different sections of public opinion in this country on the great questions of the day, and in particular on this question of the basis on which, and the extent to which, India could best co-operate in the prosecution of the war; and to satisfy myself as to the extent to which a basis of common agreement exists, and as to the manner in which the position, so far as it may still remain obscure, can best be clarified. Matters have now reached a point at which, in my judgment, it would be well that I should make a statement designed, in the light of the discussions which I have had during these past few weeks, to clear the position on the main questions which emerge at the present moment. I would make a preliminary observation. I have had the advantage of a full and frank discussion with no fewer than 52 people—with Mr. Gandhi, with the President and Members of the Congress Working Committee, with Mr. Jinnah and with representative Members of the Muslim League Organization, with the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, and with a great variety of persons prominent in the political life of British India.
As was only to be expected, conversations with representatives of so many different points of view revealed marked differences of outlook, markedly different demands, and markedly different solutions for the problems that lie before us. Again, and that too was what might have been expected at a time such as the present, reservations or demands for special protection on one side have tended to be balanced by proposals for still more marked constitutional changes on another. I would ask that these differences of view, deeply and sincerely held, I have not the least doubt, by those who have advanced them to me, should be borne in mind when we consider our present problems, for they have a very direct and obvious relevance to them.
[p. 205] I trust most earnestly that I shall be able to dispel certain misapprehensions which are, I am clear, widely and genuinely held, and that, even if to a degree more limited than has been urged upon me from many quarters, I may be able to clarify the position as regards our hopes and our objectives for India, and to make some little contribution to the removal of the obstacles which existing doubts on that point have caused to that full, generous, and ready co-operation which it is I am certain her anxiety and that of her peoples to give today to a good cause.
The essential matters on which a clarification of the position is beyond any question desired are—
First, What are the objectives of His Majesty's Government in the war? To what extent are they of such a character that India with her long history and great traditions can, with a clear conscience, associate herself with them?
Second, What is the future that is contemplated in the constitutional sphere for the Indian Continent? What are the intentions of His Majesty's Government? Is it possible to define those intentions more precisely and in such a manner as to leave the world in no doubt as to the ultimate status envisaged for India as far as the British Commonwealth is concerned?
Third, In what way can the desire of India and of Indian public opinion for a closer association, and an effective association, with the prosecution of the war best be satisfied?
Let me deal with these questions in the order in which I have stated them. Let me in the first place consider to what extent in existing conditions and at this stage in the development of the campaign on which we are engaged any positive and satisfactory answer admits of being given to the demand for a more precise definition of our objectives. In endeavouring to answer that question I do not propose to touch on the question of our objectives for India. That is a matter which I will deal with separately in answering the second question which I have mentioned above. His Majesty's Government have not themselves yet defined with any ultimate precision their detailed objectives in the prosecution of the war. It is obvious that such a definition can come only at a later stage in the campaign, and that when it does come, it cannot be a statement of the aims of any single ally. There may be many changes in the world position and in the situation that confronts us before the war comes to an end, and much must depend on the circumstances in which it does come to an end, and on the intervening course of the campaign.
The experience of all history shows in these circumstances the unwisdom and the impracticability of precise definition at so early a stage as that which we have now reached. But the fact that, for the reasons I have given, precise definition is not practicable does not mean, as I see it, that there is any real doubt, or any uncertainty, in the minds of the public, whether in India or in the United Kingdom or in any allied country, as to the motives which have actuated us in [p. 206] entering into the war, and consequently the broad general objectives which we have before us in the campaign which is now being waged. We are fighting to resist aggression whether directed against ourselves or others. Our general aims have been stated by the Prime Minister within the last few days as follows:—‘We are seeking no material advantage for ourselves. We are not aiming only at victory, but looking beyond it to laying a foundation of a better international system which will mean that war is not to be the inevitable lot of each succeeding generation. We, like all the peoples of Europe, ‘long for peace; but it must be a real and settled peace, not an uneasy truce interrupted by constant alarms and threats.’ This statement, I think, clearly establishes the nature of the cause for which we are fighting, and justifies, if justification is needed, the extension by India of her moral support and her goodwill to the prosecution of that cause.
Let me turn now to the second question which has been put to me—the question of India's future and of the lines of her constitutional development. That is a question, I am certain in the light of my conversations, which is of the greatest and most acute interest to all parties and all sections of opinion in this country. As matters stand today, the constitutional position of India and the policy of His Majesty's Government are governed by the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. Part III of that Act, which provides for the conferment of Provincial Autonomy on the Provinces of British India, has been implemented. For nearly 2½ years now the Provinces have been conducting their own affairs under the scheme of the Act. That they have done so, on the whole, with great success, even if now and then difficulties have arisen, no one can question. Whatever the political party in power in those provinces all can look with satisfaction on a distinguished record of public achievement during the last 2½ years. The experience that they have had has shown beyond any question that whatever minor problems the application of the scheme of the Act may have presented, whatever difficulties may have confronted us in the operation of the Act from time to time in the provincial sphere, the scheme of the Act is essentially sound, and that it transfers great power and gives great opportunities to popularly elected governments dependent on the support of a majority in their legislatures.
The second stage contemplated by the Act was the reconstitution of the Central Government on such a basis as to achieve the essential goal of Indian unity. The method contemplated for that purpose was the achievement of a Federation of All-India, in which the representatives of all political parties in British India would, together with the Rulers of the Indian States, form a unified Government of India as a whole. I am only too conscious of the severity of the criticisms that have been advanced from many different points of view against the federal scheme and against the arrangements embodied in Part II of the Act. I will say today no more than that, having myself had so close a familiarity not only with the framing of the provisions, but with the preliminary work which has been done with a view to putting them into force, I have throughout believed that the federal scheme in its operation would have turned out as satisfactorily as, broadly [p. 207] speaking, we can all of us regard the scheme of Provincial Autonomy as having turned out. I will not dilate on that subject today, for our work in connection with the federal scheme has been suspended. But in reaffirming as I do my belief in the essential soundness of the federal aspects of the Act of 1935, I do so with the greater emphasis because of the evidence which the federal provisions of the Act constitute of the anxiety of His Majesty's Government to achieve, with the minimum of delay, and on the basis which appears to represent the greatest amount of agreement between the various parties and interests affected, the unity of India, and to advance beyond a further and a most important milestone on the road to India's goal.
Such being the background against which we are working, what are the intentions and aims of His Majesty's Government in relation to India? I cannot do better in reply to that question than to refer to the statement made on behalf of His Majesty's Government, and with their full authority, by the late Secretary of State for India in the House of Commons on the 6th February 1935. That statement makes the position clear beyond a shadow of doubt. It refers to the pledge given in the Preamble of the Act of 1919, and it makes it clear that it was no part of the plan of His Majesty's Government to repeal that pledge. It confirms equally the interpretation placed in 1929 by Lord Irwin, as Viceroy, again on the authority of the Government of the day, on that Preamble, that "the natural issue of India's progress as there contemplated is the attainment of Dominion Status." I need not dilate on the words of that statement. They are clear and positive. They are enshrined in the parliamentary record. They stand as a definite and categorical exposition of the policy of His Majesty's Government today, and of their intentions today to this end, the future constitutional development and position of India. I would add only that the Instrument of Instructions issued to me as Governor-General by His Majesty the King-Emperor in May 1937 lays upon me as Governor-General a direction so to exercise the trust which His Majesty has reposed in me "that the partnership between India and the United Kingdom within our Empire may be furthered to the end that India may attain its due place among our Dominions."
That is the policy and that is the position. Those are the intentions of His Majesty's Government. Let me go on to say another word about the Act of 1935. That Act was based on the greatest measure of common agreement which it was possible to obtain at the time when it was framed. It was based, as is well known to all of us, on the common labours of British and Indian statesmen, and of representatives of British India as well as of the Indian States over a long period of years. All parties were at one stage or other closely associated with those deliberations. And I can speak from personal experience when I bear tribute to the extreme anxiety of all those of us on whom, in the Joint Select Committee, there fell the more particular responsibility for devising proposals for the consideration of Parliament, to ensure that the fullest account had been taken of all interests; of the views of all political parties; and that nothing had been left undone to ensure that the outcome of our labours reflected the [p. 208] greatest measure of agreement practicable in the conditions that confronted us.
Be that as it may, His Majesty's Government recognise that when the time comes to resume consideration of the plan for the future federal Government of India, and of the plan destined to give effect to the assurances given in Parliament by the late Secretary of State, to which I have just referred, it will be necessary to reconsider in the light of the then circumstances to what extent the details of the plan embodied in the Act of 1935 remain appropriate. And I am authorised now by His Majesty's Government to say that at the end of the war they will be very willing to enter into consultation with representatives of the several communities, parties, and interests, in India, and with the Indian Princes, with a view to securing their aid and co-operation in the framing of such modifications as may seem desirable.
I have, I trust, in what I have just said, made clear that the intention and the anxiety of His Majesty's Government is, as stated in the Instrument of Instructions to the Governor-General, to further the partnership between India and the United Kingdom within the Empire to the end that India may attain her due place among the great Dominions. The scheme of Government embodied in the Act of 1935 was designed as an essential stage in that process. But I have made clear in what I have just said that His Majesty's Government will, at the end of the war, be prepared to regard the scheme of the Act as open to modification in the light of Indian views. And I would make it clear, too, that it will be their object, as at all times in the past it has been to spare no pains to further agreement by any means in their power in the hope of contributing to the ordered and harmonious progress of India towards her goal. Let me in that connection add that in the conversations I have had, representatives of the minorities have urged most strongly on me the necessity of a clear assurance that full weight would be given to their views and to their interests in any modifications that may be contemplated. On that I need say no more than that, over more than a decade, at the three Round Table Conferences, and at the Joint Select Committee, His Majesty's Government consulted with and had the assistance of the advice of representatives of all parties and all interests in this country. It is unthinkable that we should now proceed to plan afresh, or to modify in any respect, any important part of India's future Constitution without again taking counsel with those who have in the recent past been so closely associated in a like task with His Majesty's Government and with Parliament.
That some even more extensive scheme than I have mentioned, some even more widely phrased indication of the intentions of His Majesty's Government, is desired in certain quarters in this country, I am fully aware from the conversations I have had during these last few weeks. That that is a desire held with sincerity, and that those who hold it are convinced that it is in the manner in question that the future progress and development of India and the expressed intentions of His Majesty's Government can best be fulfilled, I fully and readily accept. I would utter one word only of caution. And if [p. 209] I say that the situation must be faced in terms of world politics and of political realities in this country, I do so from no lack of sympathy, and no lack of appreciation of the motives that weigh with the people of India and the ideals that appeal to them. But I would urge that it is essential in matters of this nature, affecting the future of tens of millions of people, affecting the relations of the great communities, affecting the Princes of India, affecting the immense commercial and industrial enterprises, whether Indian or European in this country, that the largest measure of agreement practicable should be achieved. With the best will in the world, progress must be conditioned by practical considerations. I am convinced myself, if I may say so with the utmost emphasis, that, having regard to the extent of agreement which in fact exists in the constitutional field, and on this most difficult and important question of the nature of the arrangements to be made for expediting and facilitating the attainment by India of her full status, there is nothing to be gained by phrases which, widely and generally expressed, contemplate a state of things which is unlikely to stand at the present point of political development the test of practical application, or to result in that unified effort by all parties and all communities in India on the basis of which alone India can hope to go forward as one and to occupy the place to which her history and her destinies entitle her. I would ask that these words of caution be not taken as indicating any lack of sympathy on the part of His Majesty's Government for the aspirations of India, or any indifference to the pace of her advance: and I would repeat that His Majesty's Government are but concerned to use their best endeavours, now as in the past, to bring about that measure of agreement and understanding between all parties and all interests in this country which is so essential a condition of progress towards India's goal.
I turn now to the arrangements to be made to secure the association of public opinion in India with the conduct of the war. India's contribution has already been great, great to a degree which has impressed the imagination of the world. At the head of the list I would put the contribution which India has made in spiritual, and not in material, terms—the support of her peoples for a cause which they can regard as a good and a righteous cause. In the material field equally her contribution is already most significant, and may be greater still. And in the circumstances the desire, the anxiety, of public opinion in India to be associated with the conduct of the war is naturally one with which I personally have throughout felt the greatest sympathy. In the circumstances I have described, the desirability of steps to ensure that leaders of public opinion should be in the closest touch with developments is of the first importance.
I have discussed with the utmost frankness with the leaders of the various parties who have been good enough to come to see me in connection with the constitutional position, by what machinery we could best give effect to this desire. We have examined a variety of expedients, and there has been no hesitation on the part of any of us in assessing the advantages and the disadvantages presented by each of them. I do not propose today to examine those various [p. 210] alternatives in particular detail. I will only say that in the light of my conversations and of the views (by no means always in accord) of representatives of the great parties and of the Princes I am of opinion that the right solution would be the establishment of a consultative group, representative of all major political parties in British India and of the Indian Princes, over which the Governor-General would himself preside, which would be summoned at his invitation, and which would have as its object the association of public opinion in India with the conduct of the war and with questions relating to war activities.
This group, for practical reasons, would inevitably be limited in size. But His Majesty's Government contemplate that it should be fully representative, and in particular that its personnel should be drawn by the Governor-General from panels prepared by the various major political parties, from which a selection of individuals to attend meetings of the group would be made by the Governor-General. I hope in the very near future to enter into consultation with political leaders and with the Princes on this question. I have no doubt whatever that an arrangement of this nature will most materially contribute to associating the Indian States and British India with the steps which are being taken for the prosecution of the war and with the arrangements that are being made in that connection: and I am confident, too, that in an association of this nature of representatives of all parties and all interests there lies the germ of that fuller and broader association of all points of view in this country which contains in it the seeds of such advantage for the future of India as a whole.
When I spoke to the Central Legislature a month ago, I made an appeal for unity. I would repeat that appeal today. It is my earnest hope that the explanations I have given will have contributed materially to the removal of misunderstandings. Even if on certain points I have not, to my knowledge, been able to give assurances so comprehensive as those which would I know have been welcomed in certain political quarters in India, I would urge insistently that this is not a moment at which to risk the splitting of the unity of India on the rock of particular phrases, and I would press that we should continue to aim at the unity of India even if differences of greater or less significance continue to exist. We live in difficult and anxious days. Great ideals are in issue. Dangers real and imminent face our civilization. Those dangers are as real and as imminent in the case of India as of any other member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Those ideals are as precious to India as to any country in the Empire or in the world. At this grave moment in the destinies of nations, my prayer to all parties would be not to dissociate themselves from the common effort, but to lend their co-operation and their assistance in the prosecution of the war. There could be no more decisive proof of India's fidelity to her best traditions than the full use of the opportunities afforded to her by the war for concerted endeavour. The ideals we have set before us, the objects to secure which we are engaged in the present struggle, [p. 211] are such as to command widespread sympathy and widespread support in India. They are in harmony with her past history and her highest traditions. It is my hope that in the grave juncture which we face India will go forward as a united country in support of a common cause."
Speeches and Statements by the Marquess of Linlithgow (New Delhi: Bureau of Public Information, Government of India, 1945), pp. 204–211, where it is dated 18 October 1939, the day it appeared in the newspapers.