The Constitutional Maladies of India: Article for Time and Tide

[p. 111] The constitutional maladies from which India at present suffers may best be described as symptoms of a disease inherent in the body-politic. Without diagnosing the disease, no understanding of the symptoms is possible and no remedy can suggest itself. Let us, therefore, first diagnose the disease, then consider the symptoms and finally arrive at the remedy.

What is the political future of India? The declared aim of the British Government is that India should enjoy Dominion Status in accordance with the Statute of Westminster in the shortest practicable time. In order that this end should be brought about, the British Government, very naturally, would like to see in India the form of democratic constitution it knows best and thinks best, under which the Government of the country is entrusted to one or other political party in accordance with the turn of the elections.

Such, however, is the ignorance about Indian conditions among even the members of the British Parliament that, in spite of all the experience of the past, it is even yet not realised that this form of Government is totally unsuited to India. Democratic systems based on the concept of a homogeneous nation such as England are very definitely not applicable to heterogeneous countries such as India and this simple fact is the root cause of India's all constitutional ills.

Even as Under-Secretary of State for India, the late Lt.-Col. Muirhead failed to appreciate this fact for, deploring [p. 112] the present communal tension, he expressed the opinion that the tendency on the part of both, those in power and those in opposition, was to consider that what the position now was would be the position always. He deplored the failure of Indians to appreciate an essential feature of democratic Government—namely, the majority and minority are never permanent, and he, therefore, felt that the minorities' opposition to Federation on the assumption that, from the outset, power would be in the hands of an irremovable majority, was untenable. But he forgot that the whole concept of democracy postulates a single people, divided however much economically, and he might well have started his study of Indian problems by consulting the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Sessions 1933-34, Vol. I, para 1). “India is inhabited by many races....often as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are nations of Europe. Two-thirds of its inhabitants profess Hinduism in one form or another as their religion, over seventy-seven millions are followers of Islam; and the difference between the two is not only of religion in the stricter sense but also of law and culture. They may be said indeed to represent two distinct separate civilisations. Hinduism is distinguished by the phenomenon of its caste which is the basis of its religious and social system and save in a very restricted field remains unaffected by contact with philosophies of the West; the religion of Islam on the other hand is based upon the conception of the equality of man.”

Perhaps no truer description of India has been compressed into a paragraph and, without this background, no understanding of Indian problems is possible. The British people must realise that Hinduism and Islam “represent two distinct and separate civilisations” and, moreover, are “as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are nations of Europe.”

[p. 113] They are in fact two different nations and if this fact is accepted by no less an authority than the Joint Select Committee, the Muslim people have cause to question the wisdom of the British Government in forcing on India the Western system of democracy without the qualifications and limitations to which the system must be subject to make it at all suitable for Indian conditions.

If, therefore, it is accepted that there is in India a major and a minor nation, it follows that a parliamentary system based on the majority principle must inevitably mean the rule of the major nation. Experience has proved that, whatever the economic and political programme of any political party, the Hindu, as a general rule, will vote for his caste-fellow and the Muslim for his co-religionist.

The British people, being Christian, sometimes forget the religious wars of their own history and to-day consider religion as a private and personal matter between Man and God. This can never be the case in Hinduism and Islam, for both these religions are definite social codes which govern not so much man's relation with his God as man's relation with his neighbour. They govern not only his law and culture but every aspect of his social life and such religions, essentially exclusive, completely preclude that merging of identity and unity of thought on which Western democracy is based and inevitably bring about vertical rather than the horizontal divisions democracy envisages.

Western democracy is totally unsuited for India and its imposition on India is the disease in the body-politic. Let us now consider the inevitable symptoms.

Led by an astute Hindu politician of the first rank, Mr. Gandhi, the Congress (which is mainly a Hindu body) had long foreseen that in the Western form of democracy lay the fulfilment of their hopes of permanent all-India dominance. All their efforts and energies had, therefore, been bent towards securing for India a completely democratic [p. 114] form of Government and they realised that the new constitution would bring their goal immeasurably nearer if it could be worked on lines chalked out by their leader and the Working Committee.

Therefore, while crying that the new constitution was thoroughly unsatisfactory and totally unacceptable, the Congress decided to contest the elections held before its inauguration and, as was inevitable, secured complete majorities in the six Hindu provinces of India, namely Bombay, Madras, U. P., C. P., Bihar and Orissa. The Congress, however, was as completely defeated in the five Muslim provinces namely Bengal, Punjab, Sind, N.-W.F.P. and Assam and even in the Hindu provinces failed to capture any appreciable number of seats in non-Hindu constituencies, particularly Muslim electorates.

This, undoubtedly, was an unsatisfactory situation for a self-styled “national” party and exposure of its communal character seemed imminent. Rushing to Wardha for guidance, the Working Committee took stock. What was the position? In five provinces they had been defeated and while they held a complete majority in six, the oppositions, weak in numbers though they were, were led by the small but solid blocks of Muslim League members.

This situation had two very unsatisfactory aspects. First it brought out the completely Hindu composition of the Congress and secondly it would be difficult to ignore and override Muslim-led oppositions as long as the Governors of provinces were in possession of special powers granted to safeguard minority interests. Realising at once that such circumstances would considerably hinder their plans, the Congress played its trump card. It refused to accept office. To the consternation of the Muslims and other minorities, overnight, the Viceroy and the Governors became suppliants. What would the Congress have them do? What assurances did the Congress need? The answer was ready.

[p. 115] Give us the undertaking that you will not exercise your special powers and we will accept office. Hastily, the constitutional guardians of minority and other rights jettisoned their trust and, amidst much mutual appreciation of each other's "statesmanship," the Congress and the British Government came into political alliance. Victory number one.

But there was still that troublesome first point. The whole game would be up if purely Hindu Governments took office and in at least three of the six provinces not a single Muslim had been returned on the Congress ticket and not more than one or two in the others. But what of it? Surely there must be at least one amongst the Muslim members who would be unable to resist the bait of a ministership. They would offer the ministership provided he signed the Congress pledge.

But would the Governor agree to this “camouflage”? What did his Instrument of Instructions advise? “In making appointments to his Council of Ministers our Governor shall use his best endeavour to select his Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, in consultation with the person who in his judgment is likely to command a stable majority in the legislature to appoint those persons (including so far as practicable members of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the legislature. But in so acting he shall bear constantly in mind the need of fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers.”

Anxiously the Working Committee analysed the implications. The Instructions seemed to be in two parts. In the first the Governor was instructed to use “his best endeavour to select” as ministers “...persons (including as far as practicable members of important minority communities) ......” The spirit underlying these words was clear. It was to secure important minorities a Minister who commanded [p. 116] their confidence and since there was no difference in the political programmes of the Congress and Muslim League parties in the legislatures, there was no reason why it was not “practicable” for a Muslim League member to be appointed a Minister.

But what about the last line: “But in so acting he shall bear in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers?” This fortunately could be turned to suit their purpose if the Governor was prepared to allow this second part, advisory and subsidiary to the main instruction, to overrule the first.

They had but to claim that joint responsibility was impossible unless the Muslim Minister was prepared to abide by the decisions of the Working Committee and their point was won. Meekly the Governors acquiesced and in order to allow the Congress to deceive the public by making it appear that it was “national” and looking after the interests of the minorities by including a “representative” of them in the Council of Ministers, accepted as Muslim Ministers individuals who by no stretch of imagination could be regarded as “representatives” of the Muslim community and who, by signing the Congress pledge, were responsible to the Working Committee alone. Victory number two.

Surprised by such easy victories, the Congress became intoxicated with power. The Working Committee arrogated to itself the position of a parallel central government to whom the provincial governments were responsible. Regional dictators were appointed, and the Ministers were entirely subject to their orders generally, and no provincial legislation could be enacted without their approval. They then proceeded to stifle even the little opposition that existed. Having dealt with the British, they now dealt with the Muslims.

An India-wide attack on the Muslims was launched. In the five Muslim provinces every attempt was made to defeat [p. 117] the Muslim-led coalition ministries and by offering local political leaders ministerships and other inducements, Congress ministries came into power in at least two more provinces, N.-W. F. and Assam. In the six Hindu provinces a “kulturkampf” was inaugurated. Attempts were made to have Bande Mataram, the Congress party song, recognised as the National Anthem; the party flag recognised as the National Flag, and the real National language Urdu supplanted by Hindi. Everywhere oppression commenced and complaints poured in such force into the Muslim League's Central Office that the Pirpur Committee, whose report is available, was appointed to investigate those grievances. Such overwhelming evidence was collected that the Muslims, despairing of the Viceroy and the Governors ever taking action to protect them, have lately been forced to ask for a Royal Commission to investigate their grievances.

Such was the position on the eve of the resignations of the Congress ministries, a position over which the British people might well ponder. Is it their desire that India should become a totalitarian Hindu State with the Central and all the Provincial Governments responsible not to their legislatures or to the electorate but to a caucus unknown to the constitution, the Working Committee of the Congress? They may rest assured that such will be the inevitable result if the Congress demand for the right of framing India's constitution through a constituent assembly is conceded.

Let us consider briefly the implications of this nebulous and impracticable constituent assembly. To commence with, the question arises why is this demand made at this particular time? The answer is obvious. The War is to the Working Committee a heaven-sent means of increasing its rule from over eight provinces to over the whole of India, States and Provinces. If the British Government are stampeded and fall into the trap under the stress of the [p. 118] critical situation created by the War, India will face a crisis the result of which no man could prophesy, and I feel certain that Muslim India will never submit to such a position and will be forced to resist it with every means in their power.

And of what type of constitutionalists will this constituent assembly consist? There are in India roughly 400,000,000 souls who, through no fault of their own, are hopelessly illiterate and consequently priest and caste-ridden. They have no real conception of how they are being governed even to-day and it is proposed that to the elected representatives of such should India's future constitution be entrusted. Is it too much to say that, since the vast majority of the elected representatives will be illiterate Hindus, the constituent assembly will be under the influence of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress leaders and the constitution that will emerge will be as the Working Committee direct?

Thus, through the constituent assembly, will the Working Committee attain its ends. British control and commerce will disappear; the Indian States will be abolished; minority opposition will be stifled and a great Hindu nation will emerge governed by its beloved leader, Mr. Gandhi, and the Congress Working Committee.

We have now considered the disease and the symptoms. What is the remedy? (1) The British people must realise that unqualified Western democracy is totally unsuited for India and attempts to impose it must cease. (2) In India, it must be accepted that “party” government is not suitable and all governments, Central or Provincial, must be governments that represent all sections of the people.

In this connection the All-India Muslim League has laid down the following broad principles :—

(1) That the British Government should review and revise the entire problem of India's future constitution de novo in the light of the experience gained by the working of the present provincial constitution, and developments that [p. 119] have taken place since 1935 or which may take place hereafter.

(2) While the Muslim League stands for a free India, it is irrevocably opposed to any Federal objective which must necessarily result in a majority community rule, under the guise of democracy and parliamentary system of government.

(3) No declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All-India Muslim League, nor any constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament without such consent and approval.

To conclude, a Constitution must be evolved that recognises that there are in India two Nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland. In evolving such a Constitution, the Muslims are ready to co-operate with the British Government, the Congress or any party so that the present enmities may cease and India may take its place amongst the great countries of the world.