Statement on the Wavell Plan, House of Commons

[3.55 p.m.]

The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Amery): May I take the opportunity of reading to the House a statement which I have been authorised by His Majesty's Government to make on the subject of India, and which is being published at the same time in India? The statement is in the form of a White Paper, and is now available in the Vote Office. It says:

"During the recent visit of Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell to this country His Majesty's Government reviewed with him a number of problems and discussed particularly the present political situation in India.

Members will be aware that since the offer by His Majesty's Government to India in March, 1942, there has been no further progress towards the solution of the Indian constitutional problem.

As was then stated, the working out of India's new constitutional system is a task which can only be carried through by the Indian peoples themselves.

While His Majesty's Government are at all times most anxious to do their utmost to assist the Indians in the working out of a new constitutional settlement, it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of the imposition by this country of self-governing institutions upon an unwilling India. Such a thing is not possible, nor could we accept the responsibility for enforcing such institutions at the very time when we were, by its purpose, withdrawing from all control of British Indian affairs.

The main constitutional position remains therefore as it was. The offer of March, 1942, stands in its entirety without change or qualification. His Majesty's Government still hope that the political leaders in India may be able to come to an agreement as to the procedure whereby India's permanent future form of government can be determined."

[…] Members object to hearing the White Paper read; after a wrangle, Amery resumes reading it.

"His Majesty's Government are, however, most anxious to make any contribution that is practicable to the breaking of the political deadlock in India. While that deadlock lasts not only political but social and economic progress is being hampered.

The Indian administration, over-burdened with the great tasks laid upon it by the war against Japan and by the planning for the post-war period, is further strained by the political tension that exists.

All that is so urgently required to be done for agricultural and industrial development and for the peasants and workers of India cannot be carried through unless the whole-hearted co-operation of every community and section of the Indian people is forthcoming.

His Majesty's Government have therefore considered whether there is something which they could suggest in this interim period, under the existing constitution, pending the formulation by Indians of their future constitutional arrangements, which would enable the main communities and parties to co-operate more closely together and with the British to the benefit of India as a whole.

It is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to introduce any change contrary to the wishes of the major Indian communities. But they are willing to make possible some step forward during the interim period if the leaders of the principal Indian parties are prepared to agree to their suggestions and to co-operate in the successful conclusion of the war against Japan as well as in the reconstruction in India which must follow the final victory.

To this end they would be prepared to see an important change in the composition of the Viceroy's Executive. This is possible without making any change in the existing statute law except for one amendment to the Ninth Schedule to the Act of 1935. That Schedule contains a provision that not less than three members of the Executive must have had at least 10 years' Service under the Crown in India. If the proposals of His Majesty's Government meet with acceptance in India, that clause would have to be amended to dispense with that requirement."

"It is proposed that the Executive Council should be reconstituted and that the Viceroy should in future make his selection for nomination to the Crown for appointment to his Executive from amongst leaders of Indian political life at the Centre and in the Provinces, in proportions which would give a balanced representation of the main communities, including equal proportions of Moslems and Caste Hindus.

In order to pursue this object, the Viceroy will call into conference a number of leading Indian politicians who are the heads of the most important parties or who have had recent experience as Prime Ministers of Provinces, together with a few others of special experience and authority. The Viceroy intends to put before this conference the proposal that the Executive Council should be reconstituted as above stated and to invite from the members of the conference a list of names. Out of these he would hope to be able to choose the future members whom he would recommend for appointment by His Majesty to the Viceroy's Council, although the responsibility for the recommendations must of course continue to rest with him, and his freedom of choice therefore remains unrestricted.

The members of his Council who are chosen as a result of this arrangement would of course accept the position on the basis that they would whole-heartedly co-operate in supporting and carrying through the war against Japan to its victorious conclusion.

The members of the Executive would be Indians with the exception of the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, who would retain his position as War Member. This is essential so long as the defence of India remains a British responsibility.

Nothing contained in any of these proposals will affect the relations of the Crown with the Indian States through the Viceroy as Crown Representative.

The Viceroy has been authorised by His Majesty's Government to place this proposal before the Indian Leaders. His Majesty's Government trust that the leaders of the Indian communities will respond. For the success of such a plan must depend upon its acceptance in India and the degree to which responsible Indian politicians are prepared to cooperate with the object of making it a workable interim arrangement. In the absence of such general acceptance existing arrangements must necessarily continue.

If such co-operation can be achieved at the Centre it will no doubt be reflected in the Provinces and so enable responsible Governments to be set up once again in those Provinces where, owing to the withdrawal of the majority party from participation, it became necessary to put into force the powers of the Governors under Section 93 of the Act of 1935. It is to be hoped that in all the Provinces these Governments would be based on the participation of the main parties, thus smoothing out communal differences and allowing Ministers to concentrate upon their very heavy administrative tasks.

There is one further change which, if these proposals are accepted, His Majesty's Government suggest should follow.

That is, that External Affairs (other than those tribal and frontier matters which fall to be dealt with as part of the Defence of India) should be placed in the charge of an Indian Member of the Viceroy's Executive so far as British India is concerned, and that fully accredited representatives shall be appointed for the representation of India abroad.

By their acceptance of and co-operation in this scheme, the Indian leaders will not only be able to make their immediate contribution to the direction of Indian affairs, but it is also to be hoped that their experience of co-operation in government will expedite agreement between them as to the method of working out the new constitutional arrangements.

His Majesty's Government consider, after the most careful study of the question, that the plan now suggested gives the utmost progress practicable within the present constitution. None of the changes suggested will in any way prejudice or prejudge the essential form of the future permanent constitution or constitutions for India.

His Majesty's Government feel certain that given goodwill and a genuine desire to co-operate on all sides, both British and Indian, these proposals can mark a genuine step forward in the collaboration of the British and Indian peoples towards Indian self-government and can assert the rightful position, and strengthen the influence, of India in the counsels of the nations."

[…] A member asks which parties are meant; Amery names the Congress and the Moslem League.

As the statement makes clear, the offer of March, 1942, stands in its entirety. That offer was based on two main principles. The first is that no limit is set to India's freedom to decide for herself her own destiny, whether as a free member and partner in the British Commonwealth or even without it. The second is that this can only be achieved under a constitution or constitutions framed by Indians to which the main elements in India's national life are consenting parties. These principles, if I may quote the Prime Minister, “stand in their full scope and integrity. No one can add anything to them and no one can take anything away.” That, I may say, is an affirmation, not only of our own loyal purpose, but of the inescapable facts of the Indian situation. We can only transfer our ultimate control over India to a Government or Governments capable of exercising it. We cannot hand India over to anarchy or to civil war. Our responsibility to the people of India themselves forbid that course, and, indeed, our responsibility to the peace of the world forbids it. On the other hand, we cannot impose a constitution that will break up the moment our authority is no longer there to sustain it. The point was forcibly stated in a recent address by Dr. Ambedkar, the recognized leader of the Scheduled Castes and the Labour Member in the Viceroy's Executive. Arguing that only an Indian constitution "framed by Indians for Indians and with the voluntary consent of Indians" could command the necessary obedience and respect, he went on: “It is useless for the British to frame a constitution for India, which they will not remain to enforce.…I, therefore, am firmly of the opinion that if Indians want Dominion status they cannot escape the responsibility of framing their own constitution.” So far, no progress has been made in that direction, and the internal deadlock, essentially a deadlock as between Hindu India and Moslem India, remains unresolved. We should be wrong, I think, to be unduly impatient with Indian political leaders for their failure to find common ground. The issues at stake are great and the differences of approach to the problem are rooted in convictions sincerely and strongly held. I trust, nevertheless, that the right solution will emerge, and certainly His Majesty's Government will at all times be anxious to give such assistance as might contribute to its attainment.

Meanwhile, India cannot stand still. Over and above the effort still required for the war against Japan, there is an immense and urgent task of reconstruction, of agricultural and industrial development, of health and education, which cannot wait for the slower processes of political adjustment, but which at the same time calls for the whole-hearted co-operation of every community and section of the Indian people. This cannot be done without some real advance in the political field, some closer and more effective association of the organised political forces in India with the government of their country.

At the present juncture that is only possible, for the reasons I have given, on an interim and provisional basis. It must be without prejudice to the ultimate constitutional settlement, whatever its character. The ideal to which we have always looked forward is that of an All-India Union in which the States would play their full part. At the same time we have also recognised the possibility that agreement between Hindus and Moslems on any form of Indian unity may be unattainable. Any interim advance, therefore, must in no way prejudge the question whether the ultimate settlement is based on a united or a divided India, or affect the existing position or future freedom of choice of the States. That means that it must be within the present constitution, for there is no change in that constitution which would not be regarded as giving a bias in favour of one or other final solution. There can be no question, therefore, of making the Executive responsible, in our Parliamentary sense, to the Legislature. That would at once, in Moslem eyes, imply the control of a unified India by a Hindu majority. Nor can there be any question of doing away with the existing power of the Governor-General to overrule a majority view of his Council, if in his opinion, I quote the words of the Act: “…the safety, tranquillity, or interests of British India are, or may be, essentially affected,” nor of his consequent responsibility to the Secretary of State and to Parliament for its exercise. That power, I should explain, is a power in reserve, not an instrument in normal use. So long, however, as there is no Indian constitution under which controversial issues can be ultimately resolved, by an accepted democratic procedure, it is a necessary protection for the minorities whether against immediate injury or against decisions which might prejudice the constitutional future to their detriment. It is, in any case, a power, as the terms of the Act clearly state, whose main purpose is to safeguard Indian interests. That applies no less to the Viceroy's duty, in the existing constitutional position, to secure the fulfilment of our obligations towards the States.

[…] Amery explains a new High Commissioner, the Council's makeup, the invitations and the release of detainees.

We earnestly hope that our offer will meet with acceptance. It is the utmost that we ourselves can do pending Indian agreement upon the final constitutional settlement. We believe and hope, however, that, if accepted, the co-operation of Indian statesmen in facing the many practical and urgent issues of India's needs, may help to bring the hour of agreement nearer. The other day Mr. Rajagopalachari, the late Premier of Madras, urged his fellow countrymen to be open-minded about any British offer in order “to use the power and opportunities so obtained to form a habit of common purpose which will cut across classes, creeds and communities…and help us to become a strong united people.” Those are the words of true statesmanship; they will find a ready echo in every quarter in this House.

In any case, the acceptance of our offer opens up a wide field of opportunity for Indians to mould their country's destiny, to build up its prosperity at home and to vindicate its importance in the world scheme of the future. India has played, thanks to the valour of her fighting men, a notable part in the world's struggle for freedom. She feels, and rightly feels, that both her past efforts and the developments which she envisages entitle her to equal pride of place both among the peoples of the British Commonwealth and among the great nations of the world. We share that desire and, so far as in us lies, are making our offer as a genuine contribution to that end. We are placing India's immediate future in Indian hands. It is for them to take and to shape it.

One last word about these proposals. No one can regard them as concessions wrung from us in the hour of weakness. They are offered in the hour of victory as an earnest of our good will to India and of our genuine desire to help forward the fulfilment of her aspirations as well as the fulfilment of our own traditions and instincts. I might indeed venture to claim that in relation to the present situation in India and in the world, they justify certain words used of this country by Emerson a century ago: “With strength still equal to the time; still wise to entertain and swift to execute the policy which the mind and heart of mankind requires in the present hour.”